de Bertodano's Memoir

Reproduced from "BREAKER MORANT AND THE BUSHVELDT CARBINEERS" Edited by Arthur Davey, VAN RIEBEEK SOCIETY, CAPE TOWN 1987, pp53-64

My comments are in red.

Be 3, National Archives, Zimbabwe

The Bushveldt Carbineers

The true story of this Regiment has never before been written. I have done so now at the express wish of the late Field Marshal Lord Milne of Salonika, who in 1901 was Chief Staff Officer to Colonel David Henderson, D. S. O., The Director of Military Intelligence at Pretoria.


At that time I was on the Headquarters Staff for Intelligence, Pretoria, and was responsible for Pretoria and Northern Transvaal.


This account is based on my Intelligence Reports to the D. M. I., my private Diaries and other papers.


As events had occurred in the area for which I was responsible for Intelligence, my Staff and I had to clear up a foul story of cowardly murders. I personally was the more embittered because unknowingly I had sent the Rev. Heese to his death in the Spelonken.


Only one book has so far as I am aware ever been written about the Bushveldt Carbineers, “Scapegoats of the Empire”, by Lieut. G. R. Witton on his release from penal servitude in Portland Prison. He had been sentenced to death by the court-martial with Morant and Handcock, but was reprieved and sentenced to penal servitude. There are few copies of this book in existence. It is mostly a garbled and untrue version of the facts. It was not worth the trouble to attempt to analyse it; therefore I have confined myself to the facts that were in my own knowledge. When the book was published, it was largely bought up by the Govt. as a false presentation of what occurred.


The Northern Transvaal was not occupied by British troops until over a year after the occupation of Pretoria. The main object was the seizure of the 180 miles of railway line north of Pretoria to the terminus at the small country town of Pietersburg.


Col. Plumer with a strong force of Colonial troops moved north from near Hamman’s Kraal and Warmbad, and occupied Pietersburg early in May, 1901. Various small townships and stations on the line were occupied and held by small posts from British Regiments, viz. Hamman’s Kraal, Warmbad, Nylstroom, P. P. Rust (Paul Potgieter’s Rust) [sic], the troops being supplied by the Railway.


I had been appointed to the HQ at Pretoria under Col David Henderson (D. M. I.) Director of Military Intelligence. The Northern Transvaal, in addition to Staff work in Pretoria, was to be my particular responsibility. The area was large, extending from Middelburg on the east almost to Mafeking on the west, with the Limpopo River as its North, North-east and North-west boundaries. Luckily the Boer forces under General Beyers were not large and more of the guerilla type; but their mobility made up for paucity in numbers and enabled them to move very quickly after destroying the Railway line at various points without much interference at first.


I took over the Northern Intelligence at the end of February, but had to direct the organisation of scouting and intelligence agents from Kroonstad O. R. C. where I was detained for a month by a commission.


The Bushveldt Carbineers had been formed by the Intelligence Department really to police the area round Pietersburg, more particularly towards the North-east where the Spelonken District is situated and South East to Lydenburg. Various parties of Boers were active in this large area and particularly in their attacks on the Railway line which was frequently blown up at first. The Bushveldt Carbineers were to keep watch on the movements of these commandos and more particularly when General Beyers made one of his sudden incursions into the District.


After the capture of Pietersburg in May 1901, matters became more stabilised and the district settled down as a strong force was stationed at Petersburg.


The B.V.C. were intended to be 500 strong and were recruited in Pretoria and Cape Town from men disbanded from several Colonial Corps. Actually only 350 men were enrolled, which was just as well as events turned out. The camp Head Quarters of the Regiment was in Pietersburg.


The Pietersburg Garrison consisted of 2nd Wiltshire Regiment under command of Col Carter, 2nd Gordon Highlanders, (Col Scott), a section of the Royal Field Artillery and a section of the Royal Garrison Artillery with a “cow gun” (i.e. 5”) drawn by oxen. Colonel Hall, R.A. was in command of the force and district.


The BVC were under command of Major Lenehan; Captain “Bulala” Taylor, Adjutant Edwards, Lieutenant Quartermaster Mortimer, Lieut. Baudinet, all Australians, Lieut. Neel (Dr.) and Lieut. Kelly. A detachment of the regiment was at Strydpoort, 35 miles south-east of Pietersburg, under Lieut. H.H. Morant; another at Fort Edward, Spelonken, 80 to 90 miles north-east of Pietersburg, under Lieut. A. Taylor (“Bamba”) of Kitchener’s Fighting Scouts, wo in 1902 became acting Provost Marshal temporarily in place of Capt Bolton (Wiltshire Regiment). Captain ‘Bulala’ Taylor later was besieged at Fort Edward by Gen Beyers. Lieut. Handcock was a veterinary officer.


“Bulala” Taylor was an Irishman who had spent years among the natives and was known as a sadist. He frequently stirred up trouble in native Kraals and then shot some native “in self defence”, as he always stated. He was notorious and was distrusted by most white men he came in contact with. He was married to a native or half caste woman and lived near Bulawayo, S. Rhodesia, where he eventually died – not in the odour of sanctity but – in a bed!


Early in May I went to Pietersburg to see Major Lenehan but found he was away, and to my amazement, ‘Bulala’ Taylor was there as second in command. I had met him in Bulawayo during the Matabele Rebellion in 1896: Neither his face nor his eyes prepossessed me and his reputation stank! to Heaven.

Comment: If the preceding three paragraphs are true then they only serve to reinforce the findings of Deputy JAG Colonel St. Clair who stated that Captain Taylor was primarily responsible for the shootings at Fort Edward. It was interference and quick reshuffling by Kitchener and his cohorts that enabled blame to shift to the more junior BVC officers and allowed Taylor to escape punishment. This freed Kitchener from guilt by association, since Taylor was his personal appointee.

Immediately on my return to Pretoria I reported to the D.M.I. Col. Henderson and told him of “Bulala” Taylor’s reputation. I urged him to see if it was possible to cancel Taylor’s appointment, as trouble was bound to ensue! The D.M.I. reported to Lord Kitchener and the matter was discussed, but it was found to be very difficult. There were other matters of importance demanding attention.


Major George Milne and I discussed the matter at length as I was seriously perturbed; however, I was told to “keep an eye’ on Bulala Taylor, for which I felt no gratitude to H.Qs!!


The murder of Rev. Heese, a German Missionary, caused the downfall of the Bushveldt Carbineers as a Corps and of three of its Officers.


Craig, Intell. Agent at P.P. Rust was suffering from goitre, a serious case, and we were anxious to get him to hospital. The nearest Hospital was Elim Hospital (Swiss, I think) in the Spelonken. The difficulty was to get him there. I offered to let him have a Cape cart, a pair of mules and a driver, and the Rev. Heese most kindly offered to accompany him as he wasn’t in a fit state to be left to a native driver only. The Rev. Heese was a German, and belonged to the German Mission stationed in Hans Masibi’s Location at P.P. Rust.


It was early in August, 1901 that Craig was taken to Elim by the Rev. Heese. The latter was to have returned to Pietersburg after a couple of days to rest the mules. Having heard nothing more beyond the fact that the Hospital had notified Lieut. N.M. McWilliam at once of Craig’s arrival and a few days later on his death under the operation, there was nothing more I could do.


To my great surprise, about the last week in August, 1901, I received a wire from McWilliam to say that the Mission station at P.P. Rust urgently required the return of the Rev. Heese. I immediately wired from H.Q. to Fort Edward asking for a full explanation as to why Mr. Heese had been detained for several weeks. The reply made some excuse for this, and said that he was leaving the next day, about 26th or 27th August. About the 29th August a further wire came to say that the Reverend Heese had been shot by Boers near Bandolier Kopjes, 15 miles from Fort Edward on the Pietersburg Road. That a Predicant (or Missionary) had been shot by Boers was a yarn I could not swallow!

Comment: This is complete nonsense. Rev. Heese departed on 23rd August. According to a letter dated 14th September 1901 from Rev. Krause (Superintendent of the Northern Transvaal Region of the Berlin Missionary Society) to Rev. H.Grutzner (Australian War Memorial PR83/120) Silas Juno reported the shooting to Rev. Endemann at Kreuzberg on 24th August.

Rev. Endemann relayed the information to Rev. Krause who sent return instructions to Endemann to send out a party to investigate. He also sent a telegram on 25th to the military authorities informing them of the incident.

Endemann’s party found the Cape cart and some of Rev. Heese’s belongings but not his body


For some time indefinite rumours had been seeping in to Pietersburg of the behaviour of the Carbineers, but nothing definite, beyond the death of Captain Hunt.


I left Pretoria at once and made the remark to Major George Milne, “The Ball has commenced!” referring more particularly to the low opinion I had of Captain “Bulala” Taylor. We could get no further information from Fort Edward about the affair as the telegraph line was out of order!! It always was when it suited Fort Edward not to communicate.


I sent off two splendid native Scouts, Hans and Kaffirland, (Basuto) who had played a big part for me in Intelligence in Kroonstad, 1900, and had accompanied me to Pretoria. Their orders were that they were to reach Fort Edward from the East or South-East, that they had come from anywhere except Pietersburg, that they were to arrive at the native kias about dusk, leave their horses some distance away, and get all the information possible, but on no account to remain longer than a couple of hours and under no circumstances to stay the night.

Comment: Kroonstad is approximately 600km from Fort Edward. The local tribes were in frequent conflict yet de Bertodano would have us believe that, over the course of a couple of hours the locals would trust two complete strangers from so far away and impart so much information, despite the fact that:

  1. As he stated above “All the natives were in fear of ‘Bulala’” so it is highly improbable that they would confide in two total strangers;

  2. Even if they spoke the same native language, the dialects would certainly be different enough to prevent them from eliciting so much intricate detail in such a short period of time.



A week later they had not returned and both McWilliam and I came to the conclusion that something had miscarried and that they had been shot. However, on the 9th day, Hans turned up alone. They had carried out instructions strictly as to the reasons for their presence, and had left their horses well concealed nearly a mile away. The native servants at Fort Edward talked very freely to them with little prompting, gave them a description of the shooting of the Boer prisoners. Hans had been warned on no account to mention the murder of Rev. Heese unless the subject was first brought up by the Fort Edward natives. This was brought up almost at once, little prompting was necessary. The story told them was that on receipt of a telegram from Pietersburg, “Bulala” Taylor and … (evidently Lenehan) seemed to be rather worried and said the driver of Heese’s Cape cart was to have the mules inspanned to start next day for Pietersburg. All the natives were in fear of “Bulala”. While the discussion was going on, one of the “boys” left and went to the Mess and returned shortly afterwards with a white man in shirt sleeves and slacks. He came to where they were talking and asked who the two strange “boys” were. They told him a story which he appeared to accept and said they could stay the night at the Camp.


Hans had brains above the ordinary and was at once suspicious of the sudden appearance of the white man, and asked if the latter usually came to the camp. Apparently it was unusual. This was warning enough. He told Kaffirland to come and get their blankets. One “boy” whispered to him “not to return”. When they reached their horses , Kaffirland was tired and refused to clear out and said he would stay at the camp. Hans quoted his strict orders, but as the other refused to obey, he rode off at once, making a wide detour to the north, thinking the Carbineers would probably watch for him on the south of the Pietersburg road. He had intended to warn Kaffirland to do the same, but in his impatience to get away from Fort Edward as quickly as possible, he forgot to do so, - perhaps as well! He saw Kaffirland ride off to the native camp. That was the last that was ever seen or heard of Kaffirland!


Hans had a difficult time in getting back, but wisely avoided the Pietersburg road and approached the township from the west.


The story he told was as follows: When the Rev. Heese arrived with Craig, he was received pleasantly, and after leaving Craig in Hospital, was pressed to stay a few days to rest the mules. When a small party of Boers who had surrendered were brought in, he was seen in conversation with them and there is little doubt that they told him what was prominent in their minds at the time; that though they had surrendered under the white flag, they were going to be shot. Whatever the subject of the conversation, the suspicion that the Rev. Heese knew was his own death sentence.


The Rev. Heese’s native driver, living with the natives, had for several weeks heard most of the prevalent gossip and repeated it to the Missionary. When the latter endeavoured to fix a day for his return to Pietersburg, he was constantly put off by one excuse or another; either that wandering parties of Boers were infesting the road or, as on one occasion, one of the mules was lame. The driver had said that one of the Carbineers, fearing that they might drive off one night, as they intended doing, had deliberately lamed a mule by a knife or nail and it could not be used for a week.


There is little doubt that the Rev. Heese had heard the whole tale of the mis-doings of the Carbineers.


The natives loathed and feared “Bulala” Taylor at his first appearance owing to his reputation in Matabeleland which had quickly followed him. His domination of Major Lenehan and other officers was evident even to the “boys” at Fort Edward.


According to one of the “boys” who either waited at the Mess or worked in the office, a good deal of anxiety was caused by a telegram from Pietersburg as to why the Rev. Heese had not been sent back several weeks before. A good deal of argument took place between the “two boss officers” (Lenehan and Morant) and one or two more, and eventually orders were given to have the Cape cart and mules ready to start the next day, “not early”, and the Rev. Heese was duly notified.

Comment: Major Lenehan was sent to Fort Edward in early September and arrived there on 7 September 1901, so de Bertodano’s claim that he was colluding with Taylor and Morant to delay Rev. Heese’s departure is a complete fabrication! Heese actually departed at around 10am from Elim Hospital on 23 August 1901 and was shot near Bandolier Kop later that afternoon. Two witnesses at the court-martial testified that they saw Rev. Heese alive at around 2pm in the vicinity of Bandolier Kop.

When the Cape cart had travelled about 5 miles from Headquarters, Morant and Handcock appeared out of the bush. They left their horses close by with Morant’s servant or boy and had some conversation with the Rev. Heese, said they were very sorry he was leaving them, and to come back again (!) shook hands with him and said goodbye.

(Asked how the native horse handler knew what was said, Hans replied he spoke English well and gave his name; the “Boy” was well known in Pietersburg.)


As the driver was just starting the mules, Handcock shot him through the back of the head. At the report, the Rev. Heese turned to see what was the cause of the shot, and Morant shot him through the side of the head. There was a third shot, the horse-holder says, but he was so terrified he could not be sure. This may be the shot through the breast referred to in Witton’s book.


The mules tried to bolt, but evidently the driver’s death grip held them back as he had fallen into the bottom of the Cape cart with the reins under him.

This had been very graphically described by the horse-holder.


As soon as Handcock had shot the driver, he jumped to the mules’ heads and held them. Morant warned the “boy” that if he ever breathed a word (or words to the effect) about this, they would shoot him too. Both Missionary and driver were dead.


Handcock got into the driver’s seat and took the reins and drove the Cape cart. Morant and their “Boy” followed on horseback for some miles until they were near a place called Bandolier Kopjes (about 15 miles from Fort Edward).


(Witton’s story of this represents the finding of the body as being “nearly a week later” than the murder: that the mules had bolted and jammed the wheels between some trees and a telegraph post with the pole broken. He doesn’t offer any suggestion as to how the mules freed themselves from the broken end of the pole or how the straps to the pole had become unfastened. He does not explain how it was that a wire was sent the day following the start from Fort Edward saying that the Rev. Heese had been murdered by the Boers!)


Hans repeated that Morant’s “boy” was terrified and there was some discussion as to whether all the natives should not clear out; it was decided not to do so owing to their fear, not only of Bulala Taylor, but of Morant himself.

Comment: Bill Woolmore (“The Bushveldt Carbineers and the Pietersburg Light Horse”, p100) was moved to write:

“Whether Hans’ yarn was concocted by him or by de Bertodano himself, we will never know, but regardless of its creator, the story is an implausible fabrication. It highlights the difficulty of arriving at the truth in the BVC story and cutting through the fabrications that corrupt it.”

However, Peter FitzSimons didn’t see the need to question the “yarn” and repeated it faithfully in his novel “Breaker Morant”. No doubt it was lapped up by his gullible readers.


This story gave McWilliam and myself much cause for anxiety. A day or two later, Major Lenehan reported that the Rev. Heese had been buried and that every effort was being made to capture the Boers, his murders!


I had a long conference with Col. Hall, who was then commanding at Pietersburg and at last convinced him that the only chance of our obtaining the necessary information was to let the matter die down and show no further interest in it: that I would arrange this with H.Qs. Pretoria


We were faced with the fact that Lenehan, Bulala Taylor, Morant chiefly, and perhaps one or two others were a certain coterie which apparently had no respect for life and that if we were to be successful in getting evidence, it could only be done secretly.


We communicated secretly with Ledeboer, the agent attached to the Carbineers; he was evidently not in the secret with those in command for fear of his reporting facts. He was warned to find out the characters of the “boys” employed at the Fort and to what extent they could be trusted. He was particularly told to find out how far Morant’s “boy’s” statements could be trusted. Ledeboer was a very capable man of a Natal family who spoke the native languages as well as he did Dutch and English. He carried out his work well in spite of its difficulties and we had a pretty accurate dossier of all the natives at Fort Edward.


He could never find out anything of Kaffirland who it was said had gone to Lydenburg. The last seen of him was when he was seen accompanying one of the officers to shoot guinea fowl, and the last heard was that he left his officer some miles away and had “cleared out”! Nearly a year later the skeleton of a native found in a Kloof not far from where he was supposed to have left the officer; however, there was no possibility of identification as no passes or papers were found on the body.


The practice at Fort Edward was to have a couple of “boys” to watch the others. Morant’s “boy” told Ledeboer something of the murder of the Rev. Heese, but was so terrified that I advised no further attempts should be made to question him until we could get him safely away.


On my return to Pretoria, I reported the matter fully and Lord Kitchener instructed me to investigate it “at any cost: it has occurred in your territory.”


We organised a party of half a dozen “boys” and instructed them how to follow up any clues that came to light, not an easy business. But luckily they were so afraid of Taylor and the Carbineers that they became more cautious than we had hoped for.


I thought out a method of payment for services rendered which worked well in spite of its apparent improbability of success. A reliable “boy” went every week into the Spelonken to visit the “boys” who were giving information; he had to play cards or some native game for money, say 5/- or 10/-, with the agent and to lose this amount to him, never more. The agent was told of a subsequent reward when the work was completed. A method was adopted of checking this by the next “boy’s” visit. In spite of the improbability of success of which I was only too well aware, it worked remarkably well, and over a period of several months only once was one of the “boys” caught out in trying to cheat.


Our “boys” took a keen interest in getting information but unfortunately it was only that of natives. The greater difficulty was to get evidence from white men. We succeeded in this eventually to a certain degree, but in the case of the murder of the Rev. Heese there was little probability of this as the only witness was Morant’s “boy”.


After Morant and Handcock had left the Cape cart at Bandolier Kopjes jammed between the trees and the telegraph pole, they separated. The evidence however proved that Handcock had been seen in the neighbourhood of the murder and only returned to H.Q. for his supper.


An amusing incident occurred after a game between our “gambler” and a “boy” who was well known to the Rev. Reuter of the Medingen Mission not far from Fort Edward. The Rev. Father on one occasion met our man and gave him a severe lecture on the wickedness of gambling (no doubt with a twinkle in his eye) and threatened to report him to Fort Edward. I haven’t a doubt that he had some inkling that the matter was not dead as we had tried to make it appear, because I received a mysterious and anonymous warning that under no circumstances must “Captain de Bertodano” ever set foot in Spelonken. Thinking that this emanated from Bulala Taylor, I was foolish enough to consider doing so, in fact had actually set out on one occasion with a patrol from Pietersburg, but on the same day was recalled by H.Q. to Pretoria. It was only a little later that I found that the warning was genuine and concluded that my unknown friend was Father Reuter. I always regretted never having met him: a fine man.


(The only reason for supposing that someone objected to my presence in the Spelonken was that I had some time before caught out a Staff officer in Pretoria who had betrayed important information to the Boers: this caused considerable stir and my name had been bandied about in connection therewith (I had and have always disliked the “lime light”:) The Officer in question was kicked out of the Services. Lord Kitchener tried his best to have him tried by Court-martial but the then Prime Minister, Arthur Balfour, was afraid of the scandal.)


For months we worked hard to collect the necessary evidence to convict Morant and Handcock for the murder of the Missionary. Morant’s “boy” was the only witness who saw the murder so far. We tried to get this “boy” to Pietersburg for safety but could not manage it without rousing suspicion.


Whether Morant had some suspicion that enquiries were going on or not, I cannot say, but when he went on leave to Pretoria, his “boy” did not accompany him except when he left Fort Edward with Morant. At any rate the “boy” was not with Morant when he arrived at Pietersburg. We were never able to find any trace of the unfortunate lad and came to the conclusion that he had been shot. When the trial took place, enquiries were made at all the locations (Magatos, etc.) and a reward offered, with no effect.

Comment: Given that de Bertodano’s account of Morant’s shooting of Rev. Heese is a complete fabrication then Morant would have no reason to shoot his “boy” and so this is another of de Bertodano’s lies.

The evidence of the shooting of the Boers who had surrendered under the white flag, caused little trouble as the facts had been admitted by the accused. But in the case of the murder of the Rev. Heese, no direct white evidence, could be procured. Morant and Handcock were found “not guilty”. I do not think there was a man on the Court-martial who did not but believe that they were guilty. Had we been able to find Morant’s “boy”, his direct evidence would have perhaps completed the case.


I was in Pietersburg during part of the trials, but did not attend them, not even that of the Missionary: being primarily responsible for having sent the poor man into the Spelonken, and savage at his cold-blooded murder, I thought it better to keep away.

Comment: Given his record, it’s hard to swallow his crocodile tears over the death of Rev. Heese. It’s a pity he didn’t attend the trials, his “memoirs” may have been a little more factual!


One afternoon walking through the Camp, I met Morant out for exercise with a young Lieut. of the Wiltshire Regiment (dark red hair, but whose name I forget). The following is the conversation which ensued between Morant and me. I cannot, of course, recall the exact words and sequence of these, but I have never forgotten the effect of them.


Morant came up to me and said that his trial for the shooting of the Missionary was a scandal and a disgrace to the Army, that he was innocent, and that he had been selected as a victim because he had shot a few d. . . d Boers. “You are the man who worked up all the evidence and you ought to be ashamed of yourself for the betrayal of your brother officers.” I replied very quietly, “Morant, I am very proud of having been the cause of bringing you to trial. You know in your heart that you and Handcock murdered poor old Heese because you were afraid that he would report the shooting of the Boers in cold blood. But you were such d. . . d fools as not to realise that we had all the evidence without calling on him. We know who is behind it all and has led you by the nose, but we haven’t got him yet (I referred to Bulala Taylor and he knew it, but I didn’t mention his name). I don’t recognise you and that poor fool Handcock as “brother officers”. You are as guilty as Hell, and I am glad to help to send you there”. (These words I have never forgotten). “Where is your boy. He has disappeared. Have you murdered him too?” I told the young officer that his prisoner was not allowed to speak to any one and walked away.


A few days later I returned to Pretoria and had to travel in the same train as the three convicted men, Morant, Handcock and Witton.


The BVC had been abolished. The commanding officer Major Lenehan had been sent to Pretoria. Witton says he was under arrest, but I doubt this.


A day or two after my return to Pretoria, to my surprise Lenehan sent in his name. He had come, he said, to complain bitterly about the indignity put upon three of his officers in that they had been sent to Pretoria in handcuffs. I looked at him and said, “You are speaking of three men convicted of murder: they are not officers”. He was taken aback and made no reply and left the office. I never saw him again. He was taken to Cape Town, under escort I believe, and shipped to Australia in the first available steamer.


In connection with this a curious incident took place twenty six years later, in 1928. Judge Laurens Armstrong of the High Court of New South Wales and an old friend (1886-1895), whom I had known as a lecturer at Sydney University, came to London and we resumed our acquaintance. Quite by chance he asked me if I had come across the BVC, knowing I had taken part in the South African War. So I told him of their exploits which had ended in their disbandment and the shooting of Morant and Handcock. He said that Lenehan had, by some means or other, obtained from one of the gaolers the blood-stained shirt of Handcock after the execution and had taken it to Australia. He managed to get some public meetings called and started to work up a campaign against the British Government by exhibiting the shirt. These meetings were a complete failure as people were disgusted and ashamed of the murders of the Boers under the White Flag, and that of the Missionary, even though they had been found “not guilty” of the latter.


Judge Armstrong urged that the story of the BVC actions should be written as it was “history” and to prevent untrue and garbled versions being published when there was no one to contradict these. It was a discreditable affair, but the British Government had done everything possible to punish those guilty of the crimes as soon as these were brought to their notice. He urged that as I was fully acquainted with all these details, I ought to write the history of it.


I consulted Lord Milne (Feb-March1933) who was C.I.G.S. and he agreed with Judge Armstrong’s views. So I made enquiries and found that the papers had not yet been released to the Record Office. There appeared to be no record in the War Office, it was therefore not possible to carry the matter further.


Lord Milne insisted, however, that I should put the facts on record, if only as a private individual, as there was no one who had been so closely connected with the affair, and knew the facts which it had not been possible to use at the trials. (Actually, today I am the the only one left of the H.Q.s staff still alive since Birdwood died 2 years ago.)


Comment: Lt.Col Barry Caligari (Retd.) noted:

‘De Bertodano’s narrative contains obvious errors and contradictions. Although urged to publish his “true” story, de Bertodano never took the opportunity to subject his account to public scrutiny and criticism as had Witton. Apparently de Bertodano did not commence his memoirs until he was over eighty years old and “the only one left of the H.Q.’s staff still alive since Birdwood died 2 years ago”. If acquiescence by contemporaries was sought, de Bertodano’s timing is convenient and self-serving. In addition, regardless of notes, de Bertodano’s memory of events after fifty years must be questioned.’


One result of the sentence and execution on 27 February 1902 was that the Australian Government cabled an earnest request for information to which Lord Kitchener cabled in reply:


“In reply to your cable, Morant, Handcock and Witton were charged with twenty separate murders, including one of a German Missionary, who had witnessed other murders. Twelve of these murders are proved. From the evidence it appears that Morant was the originator of the crimes, which Handcock carried out in a cold-blooded manner. The murders were committed in the wildest part of the Transvaal, known as Spelonken, about 80 miles north of Pretoria, on four separate days, namely, 2nd July, 11th August, 23rd August and 27th September [sic]. In one case, when eight Boer prisoners were “murdered”, it was alleged by the defence to have been done in the spirit of vengeance for the ill-treatment of one of their officers – Lieut. Hunt – who was killed in action. No such ill-treatment was proved. The prisoners were convicted after the most exhaustive trials, and were defended by Counsel. There were, in my opinion, “no extenuating circumstances”. Lieut. Witton was also convicted, but I commuted the sentence to penal servitude for life, in consideration for his having been under the influence of Morant and Handcock, The proceedings have been sent home.”

 Comment: This cable is grossly inaccurate and highlights the lengths that Kitchener was prepared to go to cover up his own role and that of his cohorts:

  1. Morant, Handcock and Witton were charged with thirteen murders including the German Missionary - not twenty.

  2. Morant and Handcock were found Not Guilty of shooting the Missionary - Kitchener implies that they were found Guilty of this crime.

  3. Handcock certainly participated in the shootings, but they were not all carried out by him as implied by Kitchener

  4. Fort Edward was about 240 miles from Pretoria (not 80 miles)

  5. Evidence was presented at the court-martial by impartial witnesses regarding the ill-treatment of Hunt.

  6. The various courts-martial recognised extenuating circumstances and recommend mercy. Kitchener ignored these recommendations.

Various comments in Australian papers can be subsumed in that of the Leader of 12 April, 1902, which Witton quotes to show “extenuating circumstances”.


Leader” 12th April, 1902:

The War Office report, supported by the direct cable from Lord Kitchener, C. in C. in South Africa, has removed the possibility of laying this flattering unction to our souls. We are not even able to discover any plea of extenuation which would lessen the guilt of deliberate and despicable murder on the part of those who were principally concerned, and who have suffered the penalty of their crime. The explanation previously offered by those who professed to have some knowledge of the circumstances went to show that the shooting of the Boer prisoners was in the nature of a retaliation for the outrage committed on a wounded British officer who was said to have been brutally put to death. This statement is still persisted in by Lieut. Picton, one of the officers tried by Court-martial, who, though, found guilty of manslaughter, escaped with the minor punishment of being cashiered.”


10 Jan. 1953 MORAL

Salisbury

S. Rhodesia



Henderson Papers, AC71/12/223


[The Marquis del Moral (after referring to his diary for 1903) to Lady Henderson,17 Nov. 1954]


I have still got all my intelligence and secret services reports – David [Henderson] said he could not leave them in Pretoria; they were too dangerous if the Boers got control in S.A. (as they eventually did). If they were known what a shemozzle there would be!



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